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“Say the Magic Words”: How Sovereign Immunity Absolves the
Federal Government from Its Obligations Under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act*
In the many decades following World War II, America has become a country
run on credit. Hardly a day passes in which the average citizen has not been
offered a new credit card, loan, or opportunity to refinance their existing debt.
Underpinning it all is a vast credit ecosystem processing incredible amounts of
data. When Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act, it attempted to
establish rules of the road to protect the hundreds of millions of citizens
interacting with this ecosystem every day. The federal government, as the
nation’s largest employer and purveyor of student financial aid, is a massive
player in the credit ecosystem. But what happens when a citizen tries to hold
the federal government accountable when it breaks the rules governing this
ecosystem? As it turns out, results vary depending on where the plaintiff
resides.
In the 2019 case Robinson v. United States Department of Education,
the Fourth Circuit considered whether the definition of “person” in the Fair
Credit Reporting Act created a waiver of sovereign immunity. Ultimately, the
Robinson court, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, determined that the answer
to this question was no, denying plaintiffs access to the civil enforcement
provisions of §§ 1681n–o. However, the Seventh Circuit continues to hold
such a waiver did occur. When provided the opportunity to settle the issue once
and for all, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
This Recent Development argues that the Supreme Court should have resolved
the circuit split by granting certiorari to overrule Seventh Circuit decisions
contrary to precedent. Further, it argues the Fourth Circuit failed to appreciate
that its ruling, combined with state sovereign immunity, absolves all
“governments” from the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s enforcement provisions.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act was meant to protect citizens from the
consequences of unscrupulous actors in the credit ecosystem, the federal
government being one such actor. While the reasoning against a waiver of
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sovereign immunity is sound, these outcomes cannot be reconciled with why the
Act was conceived.
This Recent Development concludes by advocating for a congressional
amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The addition of an explicit waiver
of sovereign immunity to § 1681n is necessary to ensure the Act’s desired
deterrent effect. Because it may be some time before the Supreme Court has an
opportunity to address the matter again, this Recent Development calls upon
Congress to amend the Act to ensure its continued vitality by clearly stating that
willful violations of the Act entitle injured individuals to sue the federal
government. Congress should do so through an even more explicit waiver of
sovereign immunity, using the “magic words” that the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits so desperately desire: “United States.” Such changes may be the only
way to ensure one of the biggest players in the game abides by the rules.
INTRODUCTION
A credit report in the United States is like a digital shadow: a picture of
who you really are, following you everywhere you go. Trying to get a job? An
apartment? Your first car? A student loan? Your digital shadow helps a lender
make the final call. But what happens when those responsible for maintaining
the shadow make errors they refuse to correct? The results can be catastrophic.1
Aware of these realities, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act
of 1970 (“FCRA” or “the Act”)2 “to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting,
promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.”3
Originally, the FCRA almost exclusively regulated Credit Reporting Agencies
(“CRAs”),4 due to their “vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer
credit.”5 The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 (the “1996

1. “For example, Kenneth Baker, a husband and father, was unable to qualify for a mortgage due
to inaccuracies within his credit report. After a year of unsuccessful attempts to correct the inaccuracies,
he felt humiliated, became depressed, and soon-after committed suicide. His suicide note referenced
his difficulties with the [Credit Reporting Agencies].” Michael R. Guerrero, Comment, Disputing the
Dispute Process: Questioning the Fairness of § 1681s-2(a)(8) and § 1681j(a)(1)(A) of the Fair and Accurate
Credit Reporting Act, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 437, 439 (2011).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x).
3. Saunders v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007)).
4. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
ACT 2 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/40-years-experience-faircredit-reporting-act-ftc-staff-report-summary-interpretations/110720fcrareport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7XW5-B7ZG] (noting the FCRA also imposed requirements on “users of consumer reports and other
third parties to provide certain notices to consumers”).
5. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 602(a)(3) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3)).
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Reform Act”)6 expanded the scope of the FCRA by imposing duties on a new
class of entities—“furnishers” of information to CRAs.7 However, rather than
define “furnisher,” the FCRA instead utilizes its statutory definition of
“person” to impose its substantive obligations upon furnishers.8 Since its
inception, the FCRA’s definition of “person” has included, inter alia, “any . . .
government or governmental subdivision or agency . . . .”9 To make these substantive
obligations operative, the FCRA imposes civil liability on “persons” who are
willfully or negligently noncompliant with the substantive requirements of the
Act.10 The federal government happens to be “one of the largest furnishers of
credit information in the country”11 and, as a “government,” coincides with the
FCRA’s interpretation of “person.” So, can the federal government be held
liable under the FCRA? As it turns out, it comes down to where you live.
The decision in Robinson v. United States Department of Education12 furthers
an existing circuit split regarding the question of sovereign immunity under the
FCRA. The Fourth13 and Ninth Circuits14 now hold there is no waiver of
sovereign immunity within the context of the general definition of “person” in
§ 1681a(b) and the civil enforcement provisions of §§ 1681n–o, while the
Seventh Circuit15 maintains there is. The Supreme Court’s decision not to
resolve the circuit split leaves a potentially large number of injured individuals
without any form of meaningful relief under the Act, while others are entitled
to relief on the same grounds. This Recent Development argues that the
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Robinson was at odds with its Rule 10(a)
considerations governing a writ of certiorari,16 especially in the face of evidence
that no government whatsoever is liable under the FCRA’s § 1681n and § 1681o
enforcement provisions. Thus, at a minimum, amendment of the Act is
necessary to protect Americans from the misfeasance of the federal government
and to fulfill the intended purposes of the Act.
6. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-426 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2).
7. See id. § 623(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)).
8. See generally id. (applying the majority of obligations imposed under the law to “[a] person”).
9. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(b) (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(b)).
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n–o.
11. Robinson v. Dep’t of Educ., 140 S. Ct. 1440, 1441–42 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari).
12. 917 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1440 (2020).
13. Id.
14. See Daniel v. Nat’l Park Serv., 891 F.3d 762, 762 (9th Cir. 2018).
15. See Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793, 794 (7th Cir. 2014); Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of
Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 2016).
16. SUP. CT. R. 10(a), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2019RulesoftheCourt.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E8WJ-H7YY]. While Rule 10 considerations do not compel the Supreme Court to grant a
petition for a writ of certiorari, one reason for granting such a petition is when “a United States court
of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals
on the same important matter . . . .” Id.
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This Recent Development proceeds in six parts. Part I briefly discusses
the FCRA and its pertinent provisions surrounding furnishers of information.
Part II discusses sovereign immunity and decisions that have analyzed the
concept within the context of the FCRA’s civil enforcement provisions. Part
III lays out the relevant factual and procedural backgrounds of Robinson, and
Part IV explains the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning and analysis. Part V then argues
that (1) the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to overrule Seventh
Circuit decisions contrary to statutory-construction precedent, and (2) the
Fourth Circuit failed to appreciate that its ruling on the matter, combined with
state sovereign immunity, absolves all “governments” from the FCRA’s
enforcement provisions. Part VI argues that the addition of an explicit waiver
to § 1681n is necessary to ensure the Act’s desired deterrent effect. Finally, this
Recent Development concludes by explaining the significant implications of the
Robinson court’s decision. Because it may be some time before the Supreme
Court has an opportunity to address the matter, this Recent Development calls
upon Congress to amend the Act to ensure its continued vitality by clearly
stating that willful violations of the Act entitle injured individuals to sue the
federal government. Congress should do so through an even more explicit
waiver of sovereign immunity, using the “magic words” that the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits so desperately desire: “United States.”
I. THE FCRA AND “FURNISHERS”
Following the conclusion of World War II, a consumer credit revolution
occurred in the United States. Between World War II and the enactment of the
FCRA, “consumer debt grew almost twenty-fold”17 to $116 billion in 1969.18
The size and scope of the credit reporting industry exploded in an effort to
facilitate the massive increase in consumer credit transactions.19 So too rose
consumer complaints about the accuracy of credit reports, as well as concerns
over consumers’ inability to correct errors and lack of general insight into the
reports’ contents.20 While Congress recognized CRAs as “absolutely essential”
due to the value of the credit reporting industry, “the fact the system ha[d] been
built up with virtually no public regulation or supervision” was a problem.21 In
response, Senator William Proxmire introduced what would become the FCRA
in an attempt to solve three basic problems: inaccuracies or misleading

17. Albert S. Jacquez & Amy S. Friend, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Is It Fair for Consumers?, 5
LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 81, 82 (1993).
18. 115 CONG. REC. 33,408 (1969). As of April 2021, that number sat at nearly $4.2 trillion.
Consumer Credit – G.19, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/ [https://perma.cc/5HDJ-AM9J].
19. See 115 CONG. REC. 33,408 (1969).
20. See id. at 33,409.
21. Id. at 2410–11.
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information, irrelevant or outdated information, and issues with
confidentiality.22 While the original FCRA was a valiant effort to address these
problems, subsequent amendments have made clear that easy solutions in the
age of technological change were aspirational at best.23
As much as the FCRA was a response to a credit explosion of the past,
Congress has repeatedly attempted to keep up with an ever-expanding credit
ecosystem. The 1970 FCRA’s laser-focus on CRAs left a gaping hole with
regard to furnishers, particularly because “consumer credit information found
within a credit report often originates with the same business entities that use
the information to extend credit to consumers: for example, the furnishers are
often the creditors of the consumer.”24 As furnishers report debtor-creditor
relationships to CRAs, a feedback loop is created as “CRAs collect, aggregate,
and analyze data received from furnishers” and the CRAs subsequently “profit
from this data by selling it to creditors, employers, insurers, and even
consumers.”25 By 1996, consumer report inaccuracies and the difficulties in
fixing them were at a boiling point.26
One change enacted by the 1996 Reform Act was to expand the scope of
the FCRA by imposing duties on furnishers.27 The 1996 Reform Act’s
amendments imposed duties on furnishers of information to provide accurate
information in the first place,28 and it imposed duties in cases where a furnisher
was informed otherwise. Section 1681s-2(b) covers “[d]uties of furnishers of
information upon notice of dispute” and states, in relevant part, “[a]fter
receiving notice . . . of a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of
any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency, the person
shall . . . conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information . . .
[and] review all relevant information . . . .”29 Rather than statutorily define a
“furnisher” in imposing these new duties, the FCRA instead uses its standard
definition of “person” to define the covered entity, a definition which notably
22. See id. at 2411.
23. See, e.g., NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 1.4.6 (9th ed. 2017),
https://library.nclc.org/fcr/010102-0 [https://perma.cc/SY4M-8G3F] (noting that the 1996
amendments had to address nearly every aspect of the original FCRA).
24. Guerrero, supra note 1, at 441.
25. Id. at 443.
26. See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 23, § 1.4.6. Prior to amendment of the FCRA in
1996, “errors in consumer credit reports were the number one item of complaint” at the Federal Trade
Commission. Id. “Forty-eight percent of the consumer reports studied by Consumers Union had errors,
twenty percent had errors serious enough to cause credit to be denied.” Id.
27. Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 623(a), 110 Stat.
3009-426, 3009-447 to 3009-448 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)). While this Recent
Development focuses specifically on duties imposed upon furnishers, the 1996 Reform Act “revised
nearly every section of the FCRA.” NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 23, § 1.4.6.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a).
29. Id. §§ 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
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includes “any . . . government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other
entity.”30
To add teeth to the new duties, the 1996 Reform Act also expanded the
scope of the FCRA’s civil damages provisions.31 In the original FCRA, civil
suits were authorized for “any actual damages,” punitive damages, and costs and
attorneys’ fees, against “[a]ny consumer reporting agency or user of information”
who willfully violated the Act.32 The 1996 Reform Act replaced the “any
consumer reporting agency” language in the original FCRA with “[a]ny person
who fails to comply with any provision of this title with respect to any other
person shall be liable . . . .”33 While a subtle difference, the FCRA now imposes
civil liability on “any person” who “willfully fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under [the Act] with respect to any consumer,”34 or who
“is negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under [the
Act] . . . .”35 With the changes, any time the federal government is treated as a
“person” furnishing information to CRAs, it could theoretically face civil
liability.
What then happens when 42.9 million consumers owe nearly $1.57 trillion
in federal student loans in 2020,36 accounting for over one-third of all
outstanding consumer debt?37 Compound these statistics with the federal
government being “the nation’s largest employer”38 and you have a furnisher
with astronomical potential liability. However, did Congress intend to waive
the federal government’s sovereign immunity by imposing duties on furnishers?
Litigants have repeatedly sought the answer to that question.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FCRA
In the same breath in which Congress enacted duties on furnishers to work
with consumers, it stripped away nearly all their power to enforce those duties
themselves. In fact, only a single private right of action exists against
furnishers—failure to comply with obligations to participate in reinvestigations
30. Id. § 1681a(b) (emphasis added).
31. Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 § 2412.
32. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 616, 84 Stat. 1127 (emphasis added)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681n); see also id. § 617 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681o)
(imposing civil liability on “[a]ny consumer reporting agency or user of information” who negligently
violated the Act).
33. Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 § 2412 (emphasis added).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
35. Id. § 1681o.
36. Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/
sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/PortfolioSummary.xls [https://perma.cc/S5EW-G8B2].
37. As of April 2021, that overall outstanding consumer debt sat at nearly $4.2 trillion. Consumer
Credit – G.19, supra note 18.
38. Federal Employers, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/odep/programareas/employers/federal-employment [https://perma.cc/7YZC-7UM6].
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conducted by CRAs when consumers dispute the accuracy or completeness of
information with a CRA.39 Sovereign immunity exists to extinguish this sole
right if the furnisher is the federal government. “It has been settled since at
least the mid-nineteenth century that the United States may not be sued
without its consent,”40 and multiple circuits have attempted to discern whether
the FCRA’s definition of “person” evinced such consent.
The first major decision on the matter came in the Seventh Circuit case
Bormes v. United States.41 In Bormes, the case had been remanded from the
Supreme Court with the specific objective of determining “whether FCRA
itself waives the Federal Government’s immunity to damages under § 1681n.”42
James Bormes, an attorney, attempted to sue the federal government for
providing too much information in an email receipt sent in response to filing
fees paid to the federal courts, a potential violation of § 1681c(g)(1).43 While
Bormes failed on the merits of his claim, the Seventh Circuit concluded
“[s]ection 1681a(b) does what it has done since 1970 . . . waive sovereign
immunity for all requirements and remedies that another section authorizes
against any ‘person.’”44 This holding, grounded strictly in textual analysis (that
the federal government is a “government” and, under § 1681a(b), a
“government” is a “person”), was subsequently narrowed by the Seventh Circuit
in Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin.45 In Meyers, a nearly identical
claim was brought by Jeremy Meyers, a plaintiff who made purchases at
multiple stores owned by the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin.46 Similar
to the plaintiff in Bormes, Meyers claimed too much information had been
placed on his printed receipts, a violation of § 1681c(g)(1).47 The Seventh
Circuit found that the use of “government” in the FCRA’s definition of
“person” to waive tribal sovereign immunity was a bridge too far, as “Congress
has demonstrated that it knows how to unequivocally abrogate immunity for
Indian Tribes. It did not do so . . . .”48 Thereby, Meyers seemingly left any
further narrowing of the waiver in the Seventh Circuit open to future debate.

39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c) (limiting §§ 1681n–o liability to violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(b)).
40. Helen Hershkoff, Jurisdiction over Actions Against the United States—The Sovereign Immunity
Problem, in 14 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURISDICTION § 3654 (4th ed. 2021).
41. 759 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2014).
42. Id. at 795 (quoting United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 16 (2012)).
43. Id. Similar to the use of “person” as operative in § 1681s-2 furnisher duties, § 1681c(g) states
“no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business . . . .” § 1681c(g)(1).
44. Bormes, 759 F.3d at 796.
45. 836 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2016).
46. Id. at 820.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 827.
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The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, was entirely unconvinced by the
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, as discussed in Daniel v. National Park Service.49 As
in Bormes and Meyers, the controversy in Daniel again revolved around
§ 1681c(g) and the contents of a purchase receipt, this time paid for an entrance
pass to a national park.50 Whereas Bormes and Meyers dubiously alleged a
procedural violation of § 1681c(g) was a sufficient injury to establish standing,51
the plaintiff in Daniel alleged more by stating she was the victim of identity
theft following the transaction at issue.52 While the plaintiff in Daniel was
deemed to lack standing due to insufficient evidence linking the identity theft
to the transaction at issue,53 the court conducted a thorough analysis on the
validity of the waiver of sovereign immunity.54 “Construing the FCRA as a
whole,” the Daniel court “view[ed] the statute as ambiguous with respect to
whether Congress waived immunity for Daniel’s suit,” so, “because ‘[a]ny
ambiguities in the statutory language are to be construed in favor of immunity,’
Daniel’s suit was properly dismissed.”55 The Daniel court bolstered this claim
by noting that Congress enacted an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity in
§ 1681u(j) less than one year before it expanded liability to “person[s]” under
the FCRA.56
With the Seventh and Ninth Circuits firmly divided on the issue, plaintiff
Anthony Robinson provided an opportunity for the Fourth Circuit to decide
whether the country’s largest furnisher of information could be held accountable
by consumers under the FCRA.57

49. 891 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2018).
50. Id. at 765.
51. See Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2014) (striking down the claim on
the merits because the receipt at issue did not meet the statutory requirements); Meyers, 836 F.3d at
822 (refraining from an in-depth analysis of standing due to the ease with which the case could be
dismissed on the question of sovereign immunity).
52. See Daniel, 891 F.3d at 766–67.
53. See id. at 767.
54. Id. at 768–76. As the court also noted, “giving Daniel leave to amend the complaint would be
futile because the FCRA does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity from Daniel’s
suit.” Id. at 765.
55. Id. at 769, 774 (quoting FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012)).
56. See id. at 771–72; see also Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 10493, § 601, 109 Stat. 976–77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(j)) (“Any agency or department of
the United States . . . is liable . . . .” (emphasis added)).
57. See Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 917 F.3d 799, 802 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 1440 (2020).
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III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF ROBINSON
It is no mystery in America that increased educational attainment
generally results in higher lifetime earnings,58 as well as many other benefits.59
Whether for a certificate, associate’s degree, or bachelor’s degree, substantial
numbers of first-time, full-time students take out loans.60 The U.S. Department
of Education administers the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program
(“Direct Loan”), which provides loans to students and parents for
postsecondary education costs.61 It was through interaction with this program
that Anthony Robinson ran into trouble. Robinson claimed he did not authorize
Direct Loan to open a loan account in his name.62 However, he subsequently
discovered there were open Direct Loan student loan accounts being reported
on his Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion (collectively, the “credit reporting
agencies”) credit reports.63 In November 2011, Robinson began disputing the
Direct Loan accounts with the credit reporting agencies, as well as directly with
the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (“PHEAA”) and Direct
Loan.64
After a few years of trying to correct the errors, Robinson filed suit against
the PHEAA, the U.S. Department of Education (“USDE”), and the credit
reporting agencies in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland,
Southern Division.65 He alleged claims for violations of the FCRA, due to their
treatment of the allegedly fraudulent student loan in his name, as well as a
common-law defamation claim.66 He also alleged that the USDE violated the
FCRA “by failing to fully and properly investigate [his] disputes,” and by

58. See Tim Stobierski, Average Salary by Education Level: The Value of a College Degree, NE.
UNIV. (June 2, 2020), https://www.northeastern.edu/bachelors-completion/news/average-salary-byeducation-level/ [https://perma.cc/KB7R-HRFU] (“Associate degree holders earn more . . . than their
peers whose education stopped after high school . . . translating into more than $293,000 over a typical
40-year career.”).
59. See, e.g., How Does a College Degree Improve Graduates’ Employment and Earnings Potential?,
ASS’N PUB. & LAND-GRANT UNIVS., https://www.aplu.org/projects-and-initiatives/college-coststuition-and-financial-aid/publicuvalues/employment-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/PBA9-MQ73]
(“Life expectancy is also longer for those who attend college.”).
60. See Loans for Undergraduate Students, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/
programs/coe/indicator_cub.asp [https://perma.cc/Y25V-TLEX] (last updated May 2020) (“Some 44
percent of first-time, full-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students were awarded loan
aid in 2017–18 . . . not includ[ing] Parent PLUS Loans or other loans made directly to parents.”).
61. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 800.
62. Id.
63. Robinson v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. GJH-15-0079, 2017 WL 1277429, at
*1 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 917 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1440 (2020).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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“failing to review all information” related to his claim.67 The complaint brought
claims under § 1681n and § 1681o, which provide civil causes of action for willful
and negligent FCRA violations, respectively.
The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds and dismissed
Robinson’s claims against the USDE.68 After comparing the alleged waiver of
sovereign immunity in the FCRA to that of several other recognized waivers of
sovereign immunity, in addition to provisions within the FCRA, the district
court reasoned that the FCRA’s language did not unequivocally and
unambiguously waive sovereign immunity.69 As neither the Supreme Court nor
the Fourth Circuit had squarely ruled whether the FCRA waives sovereign
immunity for purposes of its civil enforcement scheme, the district court
evaluated the reasoning from Bormes,70 as well as a number of district court
opinions, which split when weighing the use of “person” as a waiver of sovereign
immunity.71 The Robinson district court found itself aligning with the recent
district court decision in Daniel v. National Park Service,72 which rejected the
reasoning used in Bormes.73 The district court found Robinson’s assertion that
the federal government waived immunity in all remedial provisions that utilized
the term “person” would, among other things, absurdly expose the federal
government to criminal prosecutions—a result Congress could not have
intended “absent a clear statement.”74 It further delved into administrative
remedies that would provide Robinson redress in the absence of a remedy under
the FCRA.75 However, it is questionable whether effective remedies even exist
at all.76
67. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 800. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) covers “[d]uties of furnishers of information
upon notice of dispute” and, in relevant part, “[a]fter receiving notice . . . of a dispute with regard to
the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency,
the person shall . . . conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information . . . [and] review
all relevant information . . . .” § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
68. Robinson, 2017 WL 1277429, at *4.
69. Id. at *2–4.
70. See Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 2014).
71. See Robinson, 2017 WL 1277429, at *2–4; Daniel v. Nat’l Park Serv., No. CV 16-18-BLGSPW, 2016 WL 4401369, at *2–5 (D. Mont. Aug. 17, 2016), aff’d, 891 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2018).
72. 2016 WL 4401369, at *1.
73. Id. at *4 (“[T]he Court believes that the district court opinions from this circuit are more
persuasive than Bormes and finds that the FCRA does not contain an unequivocal waiver of sovereign
immunity.”).
74. Robinson, 2017 WL 1277429, at *4.
75. See id. (referencing 34 C.F.R. § 685.214 and Ogunmokun v. Am. Educ. Servs./PHEAA, No.
12-CV-4403 (RRM) (JO), 2014 WL 4724707, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2014)). However, the
regulations the Robinson district court referenced refer to the discharge of payments on loans created
by schools, rather than the USDE, and make no mention of corrections to the credit report of the
consumer, an essential part of Robinson’s desired redress.
76. Guerrero, supra note 1, at 439 (“Under current credit reporting legislation and regulation,
consumers are provided few remedies for experienced wrongs. This apparent lack of redress is due to
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.77 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that, despite the FCRA’s statutory definition of
“person,” there is an interpretative presumption that “‘person’ does not include
the sovereign,”78 and because it is plausible “Congress used ‘person’ according
to its ordinary meaning,” then sovereign immunity has not been unambiguously
waived.79 The court used a variety of additional interpretive methods, including
comparison to other acts with acknowledged waivers, legislative history, and an
analysis of the consequences of accepting the waiver, in addition to decisions
from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, which will be discussed at length below.80
Robinson then petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and the Court
denied certiorari.81 Notably, Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh dissented
from the denial of certiorari.82 Due to the federal government’s role as the
“Nation’s primary student-loan lender,” and its status as “one of the largest
furnishers of credit information in the country,” Justice Thomas argued the
potential liability opened up under the FCRA with a waiver of sovereign
immunity is potentially massive.83 Justice Thomas noted that “[b]ecause the
question presented in this petition has divided the Circuits and concerns a
matter of great importance, it warrants our review.”84 Without taking up the
issue, “borrowers of federal loans in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin have access
to a cause of action against the Federal Government while borrowers with the
same types of loans in 14 other States are barred from suit.”85 The Supreme
Court was keenly aware that failure to resolve the split would create a
“situation[] where litigants obtain different outcomes under the same federal
law merely because of the geographic location where their case is decided,”86 an
arbitrary outcome that undermines the entire system of justice.
the current credit reporting system’s failure to provide a framework of incentives and penalties to
motivate CRAs and furnishers to adequately address disputes, or, more generally, to ensure the
accuracy of consumer credit information.”).
77. Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 917 F.3d 799, 800 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
1440 (2020). By the time of the appeal, all claims against the nonfederal defendants had run their
course. Id.
78. Id. at 802 (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780
(2000)).
79. Id. at 803.
80. See infra Part V.
81. Robinson v. Dep’t of Educ., 140 S. Ct. 1440, 1440 (2020).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1441–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“[T]he Federal
Government is responsible for 90 percent of student loans nationwide in a market that has tripled
between 2007 and 2018, from $500 billion to a staggering $1.5 trillion.”).
84. Id. at 1442.
85. Id. at 1441.
86. See Jonathan M. Cohen & Daniel S. Cohen, Iron-ing Out Circuit Splits: A Proposal for the Use
of the Irons Procedure to Prevent and Resolve Circuit Splits Among United States Courts of Appeals, 108
CALIF. L. REV. 989, 990 (2020) (discussing the problem of increasing numbers of unresolved circuit
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IV. REASONING OF THE ROBINSON COURT
The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether the United States waived
sovereign immunity for suits alleging that the federal government willfully or
negligently violated the FCRA.87 This required the court to determine whether
the inclusion of “government or governmental subdivision or agency” within
the Act’s definition of “person” waived sovereign immunity to civil actions
under the FCRA’s general liability provisions.88 The Fourth Circuit held that
the FCRA did not unambiguously and unequivocally waive the federal
government’s sovereign immunity from liability for Robinson’s civil
enforcement claims.89
Writing for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Wilkinson began by pointing out
that “sovereign powers have ‘traditionally enjoyed’ a ‘common-law immunity
from suit.’”90 As such, “[t]he Department of Education . . . enjoys as a federal
agency a presumption of immunity from the present lawsuit.”91 The court noted
the strength of the doctrine is most important in the context of money damages,
as these judgments “allow ‘the judgment creditor’ to compete with ‘other
important needs and worthwhile ends . . . for access to the public fisc,’”92 stakes
which make consent to suit by the people a prerequisite.93 This was the basis of
Justice Thomas’s dissent to the denial of certiorari.94 For these reasons, in
addition to relying on previous precedent,95 the court stated sovereign
immunity “can only be waived by statutory text that is unambiguous and
unequivocal.”96 As such, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the
government has waived sovereign immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.”97
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by stating the purposes of the
FCRA: to “ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the
splits, caused largely by increasing caseloads in the U.S. circuit courts and a significant reduction in
the number of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court).
87. Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 917 F.3d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
1440 (2020).
88. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n–o.
89. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 806.
90. Id. at 801 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999)).
93. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)).
94. Robinson v. Dep’t of Educ., 140 S. Ct. 1440, 1441 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari) (“Were the Federal Government to be stripped of sovereign immunity without
consent, ‘private suits for money damages would place unwarranted strain on the [Government’s]
ability to govern in accordance with the will of [its] citizens.’” (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
750–51 (1999))).
95. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 802 (noting that ambiguity “exists if there is a plausible interpretation
of the statute that would not authorize money damages against the Government” (quoting FAA v.
Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290–91 (2012))).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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banking system, and protect consumer privacy”98 when handling consumer
credit information. The court then dove into the basis of Robinson’s claim—
that the USDE violated the FCRA provision that requires “persons” to
“conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information” after being
notified that a consumer disputes information relating to their credit.99
Subsequently, “[a]ny person who is negligent in failing to comply with any
requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is
liable to that consumer” for actual damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.100
In determining whether the federal government is a “person” for purposes
of the FCRA’s general civil liability provisions, the court started its inquiry
with the text of the statute.101 The court acknowledged Robinson’s claim that,
“[s]ince the federal government is a government, any government is a person,
and as any person can be liable . . . the federal government can be liable for
FCRA violations.”102 However, the court was quick to counter that “[t]here is a
‘longstanding interpretive presumption that “person” does not include the
sovereign.’”103 The court went on to note the United States is not “ordinarily”
considered to be a person and, because it is plausible Congress used “person”
according to its ordinary meaning, sovereign immunity had not been
unambiguously waived.104
The court then proclaimed statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are
normally quite clear.105 The court noted the language used in the Little Tucker
Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, as well as other statutes, all contain explicit
language denoting the “United States” may be held liable.106 In contrast, the
definition of “person” Robinson relied on does not specifically mention the
“United States” or the “federal government.”107 Notably, the FCRA actually
contains an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to information
98. Id. (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007)).
99. Id. (referring to 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. Section 1681n applies to willful FCRA violations and adds punitive
damages to the remedies for negligent violations under § 1681o. Id. § 1681n(a)(2).
101. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 802.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780
(2000)).
104. Id. at 803 (citing FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290–91 (2012)).
105. Id.
106. Id.; see Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (mentioning a “civil action or claim against
the United States”); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The United States [is] liable . . . .”);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (“[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf . . . against any person . . . including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental
instrumentality or agency . . . .”); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A)
(“[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against any person . . . including (a)
the United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . .”).
107. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 803.
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provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with its
counterterrorism efforts.108 Hence, in the court’s eyes, Congress used
considered judgment in either creating a waiver or not with regard to the federal
government.
The court also noted the awkward results of applying Robinson’s reasoning
to the overall statutory scheme. The Act’s enforcement provisions authorize
criminal proceedings against “[a]ny person.”109 The court pointed out the
“statute allows prosecution of ‘any government,’ not the employees of any
government.”110 Further, a construction of “person” that includes the federal
government would allow federal agencies and even the states to enforce the Act
against the federal government.111 What is more, § 1681n would potentially
allow punitive damages against the federal government, “trampl[ing] yet
another presumption, this time ‘against imposition of punitive damages on
governmental entities.’”112
The opinion went on to discuss the challenges posed by the broad exposure
to liability the language “any government” creates.113 In applying the Act, one
would have to consider its implications for foreign, tribal, and state
governments, in addition to the federal government.114 Noting the relative
closeness in time between the decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida115
and Congress’s amendment to the FCRA,116 the court concluded such a wideranging waiver of immunity could not have been Congress’s intent.117
The court also made clear that “just as the ordinary meaning of ‘person’
has always applied to the FCRA’s enforcement provisions, the statutory
definition of ‘person’ has always applied to the FCRA’s substantive
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(j) (“Any agency or department of the United States obtaining or
disclosing any consumer reports, records, or information contained therein in violation of [§ 1681u] is
liable [for statutory, actual, and sometimes punitive damages] to the consumer to whom such consumer
reports, records, or information relate.” (emphasis added)).
109. Id. § 1681q.
110. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 805 (rejecting Robinson’s argument that other courts have allowed the
waiver on the basis of suit against federal employees); see Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793, 796
(7th Cir. 2014).
111. See § 1681s(a)(1) (allowing FTC enforcement); § 1681s(b)(1)(H) (allowing CFPB
enforcement); § 1681s(c) (allowing state enforcement).
112. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 805 (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 785 (2000)).
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). In Seminole Tribe of Florida, the Court held that Congress lacks the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 47.
116. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 805; see also Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-426 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2).
117. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 805. The Court pointed out interpreting the term otherwise would be
in stark contrast to the Court’s “duty to construe the statutory language with that conservatism which
is appropriate in the case of a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941)).
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provisions.”118 The Fourth Circuit asserted the two are not the same, in contrast
to the stance taken by the Seventh Circuit in Bormes.119 Its textual and structural
analysis complete, the court concluded it was clear that no unambiguous and
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity had taken place.120
The court was then forced to acknowledge the existing circuit split on the
issue. Referring to the Ninth Circuit opinion in Daniel, the Fourth Circuit
mentioned the Ninth Circuit too “employed a holistic approach in interpreting
FCRA to preserve federal sovereign immunity,” reaching the same conclusion
that “[d]istilling a clear waiver of sovereign immunity in the FCRA would
require us to treat ‘the United States’ as a ‘person’ in each provision,” creating
absurd results when applied to the enforcement provisions, as discussed
above.121 Thus, it was obvious a waiver had not occurred. When exploring the
Seventh Circuit’s initial view that the FCRA set forth a waiver of federal
sovereign immunity in Bormes,122 the court made clear that decision was
undermined in Meyers, when the Seventh Circuit upheld tribal sovereign
immunity under the FCRA,123 seemingly in contrast to the Bormes reading of
“any . . . government” and what may be within that scope.124 As the Daniel court
recognized and the Robinson court reaffirmed, “the Seventh Circuit’s logic
regarding tribal sovereign immunity should apply equally to the United
States.”125
V. ANALYSIS OF THE ROBINSON COURT’S REASONING
While the Fourth Circuit was willing to rule definitively on the matter,
the Supreme Court was not ready to do the same. Both courts recognized the
importance of the issue before them. However, even in the face of substantial
evidence establishing the Act’s ambiguity, and thus nonwaiver, the Supreme
Court refused to resolve the existing circuit split. As such, the Seventh Circuit
and any other courts that decide to follow its lead are welcome to use its
rudimentary analysis to allow private citizens to sue the federal government,
and potentially states, under the FCRA, “undermin[ing] a legal principle that
many believe is fundamental: courts should apply federal laws uniformly.”126 At
118. Id. at 806.
119. Id. at 806–07; see Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The United
States concedes that it is a ‘person’ for the purpose of [the FCRA’s] substantive requirements.”).
120. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 806.
121. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 806 (quoting Daniel v. Nat’l Park Serv., 891 F.3d 762, 770 (9th Cir.
2018)).
122. Bormes, 759 F.3d at 796.
123. Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that
reading “any government” to allow suits against tribes would be “shoehorning” a tribal immunity
waiver, and that “shoehorning is precisely what [the court] cannot do.”).
124. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 806.
125. Id. at 807 (citing Daniel v. Nat’l Park Serv., 891 F.3d 762, 774 (9th Cir. 2018)).
126. Cohen & Cohen, supra note 86, at 1010.
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the same time, the Fourth and Ninth Circuit opinions illustrate that the
FCRA’s enforcement provisions have become all bark and no bite with regard
to “any . . . government,” whether federal, tribal, state, or otherwise. For
litigants such as Anthony Robinson—and potentially millions more
governmental debtors—a yearslong battle for an accurate credit report becomes
another casualty under an Act that purports to provide relief. The FCRA’s
inclusion of “government” in the definition of “person” could not have intended
such a result.
Section V.A makes the case that the Supreme Court should have granted
certiorari, while Section V.B argues state sovereign immunity principles
provide evidence that the inclusion of “government” in “person” did not waive
sovereign immunity and, further, makes the enforcement provisions entirely
inapplicable to any government.
A.

The Supreme Court Should Have Granted Certiorari To Resolve an Important
Matter on Which the Courts of Appeals Are in Conflict

Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Robinson, Justice Thomas wrote
that “[o]ne of this Court’s primary functions is to resolve ‘important matter[s]’
on which the courts of appeals are ‘in conflict.’”127 A waiver of sovereign
immunity at any level has always been one such matter.128 Particularly, as
district courts in multiple circuits continue to address similar suits without
binding precedent on the issue,129 the Supreme Court had the option to settle
this important matter going forward. Instead, litigants such as Anthony
Robinson are deprived of a legal cause of action solely based on their geographic
positioning, while the federal government retains significant potential liability
in other locales.
The Supreme Court should have used the Robinson decision to repudiate
the reasoning used by the Seventh Circuit in Bormes and Meyers. Bormes was
previously in the hands of the Supreme Court, who at that time did not weigh
in on the issue of whether the “FCRA itself waives the Federal Government’s
immunity to damages actions under § 1681n.”130 On remand, the Bormes court
held that because the United States is a government and the statutory definition
of person includes “any . . . government[,] . . . what § 1681a(b) does is waive
sovereign immunity for all requirements and remedies that another section
127. Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 140 S. Ct. 1440, 1442 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (quoting Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 408, 408
(2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (citing SUP. CT. R. 10(a))).
128. See generally Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (2016)
(providing an in-depth dive into the origins of sovereign immunity and its implications for all levels
of government).
129. See, e.g., Stein v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 450 F. Supp. 3d 273, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); Johnson v.
Trans Union, LLC, No. CV 16-1240, 2019 WL 3202212, at *2–4 (W.D. La. July 15, 2019).
130. United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 16 (2012).
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authorizes against any ‘person.’”131 When the issue again arose in the Seventh
Circuit in Meyers, the court diminished the analytical quality of the Bormes
decision by noting “the government conceded that it was a ‘person’ for purposes
of the Act so the court had no reason to engage in a full analysis of the scope of
the term ‘any government.’”132
For Anthony Robinson, bringing suit years later in a circuit without
binding precedent, the reasoning of Bormes made his case seem like a slam dunk.
He was dealing with the federal government, not a tribal government.
However, as the Robinson court noted, this completely disregards the
longstanding interpretive presumption that a statutory “person” does not
include the sovereign.133 As the Seventh Circuit noted in Meyers, “[i]t must be
said with ‘perfect confidence’ that Congress intended to abrogate sovereign
immunity and ‘imperfect confidence will not suffice.’”134 Just as Meyers
concluded the ambiguity of “any . . . government” could not be shoehorned into
a waiver of tribal immunity, it likewise cannot be shoehorned into a waiver of
sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court itself has provided the candle by which to illuminate
supposed waivers and their scope, making its decision to ignore a divergence all
the more confounding. As Robinson observed, the Supreme Court in FAA v.
Cooper135 issued a directive that ambiguities be resolved in favor of immunity.136
In Cooper, the Court acknowledged an actual waiver of sovereign immunity
existed in the Privacy Act.137 However, even once a waiver is established, the
Cooper Court mandated that courts must “construe any ambiguities in the scope
of a waiver in favor of the sovereign.”138 Clearly, the federal government’s bar
is extremely low when it comes to waivers of sovereign immunity, as the
government’s argument must simply be “plausible.”139 The Seventh Circuit,
through Meyers, has come to the conclusion that “government” as a part of
“person” is “plausibly” ambiguous, as evidenced through its carveout, and thus
does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.140

131. Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793, 795–96 (7th Cir. 2014).
132. Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 2016).
133. Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 917 F.3d 799, 802 (4th Cir. 2019).
134. Meyers, 836 F.3d at 827 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 231 (1989), superseded by
statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1403).
135. 566 U.S. 284 (2012).
136. Id. at 290 (“Any ambiguities in the statutory language are to be construed in favor of
immunity . . . .”).
137. See id. at 287.
138. Id. at 291.
139. See id. at 290–91.
140. See Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 2016); Lane v.
Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be
unequivocally expressed in statutory text . . . and will not be implied.”).
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Further, Bormes also completely disregarded the fact that “statutory
construction is a ‘holistic endeavor,’”141 thus, “when deciding whether the
language is plain, the Court must read the words ‘in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”142 As the Robinson court
explained, applying the Bormes construction throughout the FCRA would result
in absurd consequences, a situation in which the Supreme Court has said courts
should be especially reluctant to construe the waiver.143 This is even more so
when the FCRA contains an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity in another
enforcement provision, as Robinson noted § 1681u does.144 Regardless of the
liability implications, the Supreme Court should have overruled the Seventh
Circuit simply on statutory construction grounds. Fortunately, district courts
in circuits without definitive precedent on the issue have already begun to adopt
the holistic reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,145 indicating the impact
of Bormes may be constrained to the Seventh Circuit until the circuit overrules
its own precedent. However, plaintiffs continue to request the Bormes
treatment,146 and thus, uncertainty in the application of federal law remains.
B.

The Robinson Court Failed To Appreciate that Its Decision Completely
Absolves All Governments from the FCRA’s Enforcement Provisions

The Fourth Circuit failed to acknowledge state sovereign immunity not
only creates additional ambiguity, but, in combination with Meyers’s tribal
sovereign immunity carveout, completely absolves all governments from the
FCRA’s enforcement provisions. The FCRA is a statute of general
applicability; thus, the statute substantively reaches everyone within a federal
jurisdiction not specifically excluded.147 The statutory definition of “person”
141. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n
of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
142. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 474 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
143. Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 917 F.3d 799, 804 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
1440 (2020); see also Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 83 (1991)
(indicating courts should be “especially reluctant to read ‘person’ to mean the sovereign” when that
reading is “decidedly awkward”).
144. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 803–04 (“‘Any agency or department of the United States obtaining or
disclosing any consumer reports, records, or information contained therein in violation of [§ 1681u] is
liable to the consumer to whom such consumer reports, records, or information relate’ for statutory,
actual, and sometimes punitive damages.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(j))).
145. See, e.g., Stein v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 450 F. Supp. 3d 273, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); Johnson v.
Trans Union, LLC, No. CV 16-1240, 2019 WL 3202212, at *2–4 (W.D. La. July 15, 2019); Gray v.
Equifax Info. Sys., LLC, No. 19-62425-CIV, 2021 WL 1290252, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2021).
146. See, e.g., Gray, 2021 WL 1290252, at *1 (“Plaintiff requests that the Court follow the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Bormes v. United States . . . .”).
147. Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that
whether FACTA (as part of the FCRA) is a statute of general applicability is not the issue, as
“[w]hether an Indian tribe is subject to a statute and whether the tribe may be sued for violations of the
statute are two entirely different questions” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
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includes “any . . . government or governmental subdivision or agency,”148 and
thus substantively applies to any such covered entity. However, because the
FCRA was passed subject to Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, the FCRA
has extremely limited authority to waive sovereign immunity for sovereign
entities other than the federal government or to subject those entities to federal
suit. The Supreme Court has asserted that “[e]ven when the Constitution vests
in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties
against unconsenting States.”149 Interestingly enough, Justice Thomas’s dissent
in the Robinson denial of certiorari cited Alden v. Maine,150 a preeminent case on
the topic that built upon Seminole Tribe of Florida. In Alden, the Court explained
that private suits against nonconsenting states “may threaten their financial
integrity,” “place[] unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to govern in
accordance with the will of their citizens,” and create “compet[ition] with other
important needs and worthwhile ends for access to the public fisc.”151Among
many rationalizations for why Congress could not subject the state to suit in
Alden, Congress was held to be constitutionally barred from impugning the state
public fisc on federalism grounds.152 “Like the federal government, states have
a direct relationship with and obligation to the governed.”153
Just as Meyers curtailed the Bormes decision when faced with the
consequence of tribal sovereign immunity being abrogated, the same is true
when state sovereign immunity is waived. While all cases discussing this
particular provision revolved around whether the federal government waived
its sovereign immunity, the fact that the exact same logic would have
impermissibly waived sovereign immunity for states makes it clear that the
same language could not have unequivocally waived federal sovereign
immunity, because “any . . . government” would have to include state
governments, due to the applicability of the FCRA to them in its substantive
provisions. The logical conclusion is that by leaving “government” sufficiently
undefined within the definition of “person,” only one form of government could
even potentially be held liable in the enforcement provisions of the FCRA, that
being the federal government. As the FCRA’s enforcement provisions actually
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b).
149. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
150. 527 U.S. 706, 758–60 (1999) (holding Congress could not subject a state to suit in state court
without its consent when state probation officers brought an action against the state for a violation of
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
151. Id. at 750–51.
152. See Smith, supra note 128, at 452 (“If Congress could authorize suits against states under its
Commerce Clause power, this would give Congress the ‘power to authorize suits in state court to levy
upon the treasuries of the States for compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and even punitive damages
[that] could create staggering burdens, giving Congress a power and a leverage over the States that is
not contemplated by our constitutional design.’” (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 750)).
153. Id.
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contain an explicit waiver in which it uses “[a]ny agency or department of the
United States”154 rather than “person,” all governments are effectively excluded
from liability under the enforcement provisions of the FCRA, rendering the
inclusion of “government” in the definition of “person” completely superfluous
with regard to the enforcement provisions of the FCRA. As such, with regard
to governmental entities, the FCRA is a statute with no teeth when it comes to
private rights of action and fulfilling its purpose to protect consumers. When
Anthony Robinson is denied a job, an apartment, or a credit card after years of
struggling against the USDE, he sits alone with those consequences; the courts
are powerless to make things right.
VI. AMENDING THE LANGUAGE OF § 1681N TO PROTECT CONSUMERS
AND MAINTAIN DESIRED DETERRENCE
As has been discussed, consumers are provided only one private right of
action against furnishers, centered on failures to comply with obligations to
participate in reinvestigations.155 Section V.B established that should the
furnisher be any government or its constituent parts, consumers are left with
no private remedies. These facts make the case that, at a minimum, an
amendment to § 1681n is needed to ensure the provision’s continued vitality as
a means of recourse for consumers when the federal government violates the
FCRA. While Robinson asserts that waivers of sovereign immunity need not
“use magic words,”156 with respect to the FCRA, the magic words “United
States” are indeed necessary. Under Robinson, Daniel, and subsequent cases now
relying on their reasoning, the federal government has not waived sovereign
immunity in its enforcement provisions through the use of “person.” Because
consumers are not provided private recourse against the federal government
under § 1681n and § 1681o, the remaining powers of enforcement lie at the
discretion of the Federal Trade Commission (unless the entity is regulated by
another federal agency), which has subsequently moved general administration
of the Act to the Bureau of Consumer Protection.157 As noted in Robinson, “the
prospect of the [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] pursuing a civil action
against the United States” is hardly less odd than it pursuing a criminal
prosecution of the United States.158 As such, it is safe to assume the federal
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681u.
155. Id. § 1681s-2(c) (limiting §§ 1681n–o liability to violations of § 1681s-2(b)).
156. Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 917 F.3d 799, 804 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting FAA v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 284, 291 (2012)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1440 (2020).
157. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.71; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1) (allowing FTC enforcement);
§ 1681s(b)(1)(H) (allowing CFPB enforcement). The FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection and the
CFPB have concurrent jurisdiction under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and coordinate any
enforcement actions under the Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 5514(c)(3)(A). For the purpose of this Recent
Development, the distinction is negligible.
158. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 805.
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government and subsequently “any . . . government” acting as a furnisher is free
to willfully or negligently avoid compliance with the FCRA furnisher
obligations without fear of any enforcement mechanisms whatsoever (unless
explicitly authorized elsewhere), both governmental and private. Such a
situation harkens back to why furnisher obligations were enacted in the first
place.159
To rein in rogue governmental furnishers, precision is needed where
ambiguity has proven to be insufficient. Interestingly, Congress enacted the
FCRA’s explicit waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 1681u(j) less than
one year before Congress expanded §§ 1681n–o liability to “person[s]” under
the FCRA.160 Notably, § 1681u(j)(3) authorizes punitive damages should the
violation be willful or intentional.161 While Robinson argued exposing the federal
government to punitive damages “would trample yet another presumption, this
time ‘against imposition of punitive damages on governmental entities,’”162
Congress expressed it was explicitly willing to subject the United States to such
punitive damages under the FCRA. Even Daniel was willing to acknowledge
punitive damages are acceptable so long as the provision is “explicit in licensing
punitive damages against the sovereign, as it was in § 1681u(j).”163 Despite all
the faults in its reasoning, Bormes was insightful in regarding how to address
governmental exposure under the Act: “If the interaction of § 1681a(b) and
§ 1681n(a)(2) creates excessive liability—which it won’t if federal officers obey
the statute—then the solution is an amendment, not judicial rewriting of a
pellucid definitional clause.”164 The problem is not the liability itself, but rather
that the courts are trying to clean up Congress’s mess. Just as Congress has done
in the past, it must once again take up the pen and amend.
To rationalize its role as problem solver in the interim, the court in Daniel
bolstered its textual analysis with legislative history by stating “[t]he lack of any
reference to potential federal liability is particularly glaring given the federal
government’s role as the nation’s largest employer, lender, and creditor, and its
corresponding vulnerability to suit under the new FCRA provisions.”165
However, one must keep in mind that when the FCRA was amended in 1996,
“[t]he driving force behind the changes was the significant amount of inaccurate
information that was being reported by consumer reporting agencies and the
159. Guerrero, supra note 1, at 438.
160. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, §§ 601, 624, 109
Stat. 976–77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n–o).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(j)(3) (“[I]f the violation is found to have been willful or intentional, such
punitive damages as a court may allow . . . .”).
162. Robinson, 917 F.3d at 805 (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 785 (2000)).
163. Daniel v. Nat’l Park Serv., 891 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2018).
164. Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793, 796 (7th Cir. 2014).
165. Daniel, 891 F.3d at 776.
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difficulties that consumers faced getting such errors corrected.”166 The federal
government was as much a furnisher before the amendments as it was after, and
thus cannot be separated from the impetus for amendment. Furnishers of credit,
including the federal government, have monumental power over the day-to-day
lives of consumers. Errors have the power to deny people access to the
necessities of life.167 In Anthony Robinson’s case, his battle in the courts took
years, a period in which irreparable harm can be done to one’s life.
“Government” is included in the definition of “person” because Congress saw
the necessity of applying the substantive requirements of the FCRA upon
government. To make those substantive requirements meaningful, Congress
needs to amend the language of § 1681n(a). Congress need merely add the
verbiage of § 1681u(j)’s existing waiver, “or [a]ny agency or department of the
United States,” after “any person.” In doing so, the federal government is only
exposed to punitive damages for “willful noncompliance” under the FCRA, a
threshold already in place under § 1681u(j).168
Notably, proof of actual damages is not required for an award of statutory
or punitive damages in an instance of willful noncompliance under the
FCRA;169 however, the presence of actual damages is likely to bear on the
amount of punitive damages awarded. If § 1681n is amended to allow a
consumer to bring a claim against the federal government for willful
noncompliance, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins170—that a mere statutory violation may not be enough to establish
standing171—is likely to quell the concerns of the federal government. To satisfy
the standing requirements of Article III, a “plaintiff must have (1) suffered an
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
166. S. REP. NO. 108-166, at 5–6 (2003) (referencing the 1996 Reform Act).
167. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 23, § 1.1.2 (“Information contained in a consumer’s
credit reporting file affects their access to home mortgages, car loans, credit cards, utility services,
residential tenancies, employment, and insurance. In addition, it can control the rate at which
consumers may obtain credit.”).
168. The term “willfulness,” within the meaning of the FCRA, includes acting with “reckless
disregard” of one’s obligations under the statute. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57
(2007). A Fourth Circuit opinion concluded that “repeated failure to comply with known regulations
can move . . . conduct from inadvertent neglect into reckless or deliberate disregard (and thus
willfulness) . . . .” Am. Arms Int’l v. Herbert, 563 F.3d 78, 85 (4th Cir. 2009).
169. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 23, § 12.5.4.1.2; see also TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534
U.S. 19, 35 (2001) (“Punitive damages . . . could presumably be awarded at the moment of . . . alleged
wrongdoing, even if ‘actual damages’ did not accrue at that time.”).
170. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
171. Id. at 1549. In Spokeo, a consumer brought an action alleging that a website operator published
inaccurate information about him in violation of the FCRA. Id. at 1544. The Court held that “a bare
procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, [does not] satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
of Article III.” Id. at 1549. Negligent violations of the FCRA are not actionable in the absence of actual
damages, and therefore do not give rise to Article III standing challenges.
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decision.”172 Importantly, the injury must be “concrete.”173 Under the FCRA,
“the best cases include evidence of damages, such as a denial of credit, and
monetary and emotional harm, that resulted from the failure to comply with the
FCRA’s reinvestigation requirements,”174 facts which would create a concrete
injury.175 Spokeo noted that although “Article III standing requires a concrete
injury even in the context of a statutory violation . . . the violation of a
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to
constitute injury in fact.”176 With amendment, it would be the task of Robinson
and other plaintiffs to either (1) establish a traditional concrete injury or (2)
argue the procedural violation itself is sufficient, a more difficult endeavor.177
For all the Robinson court’s fears of immense federal government liability
as “one of the largest furnishers of credit information,”178 plaintiffs face an
arduous road to succeeding in a private action. By waiving sovereign immunity
for willful noncompliance, the government is only held accountable for
recklessly violating their obligations under the Act. There is a record of the
courts finding willful violations of § 1681s-2(b) by furnishers of credit
information per § 1681n actions and awarding damages.179 Thus, there is no
reason to think the federal government would not reform to protect itself.
However small the likelihood, such accountability creates the desired deterrent
effect.

172. Id. at 1547. “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that they suffered ‘an invasion
of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
Notably, the Daniel court not only made clear there was no waiver of sovereign immunity, but also that
the plaintiff failed to satisfy all three elements, even in the face of alleged identity theft. Daniel v. Nat’l
Park Serv., 891 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 2018).
173. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
174. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 23, § 10.2.1.3.
175. Spokeo also recognized that Congress “may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’” 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). However, courts have been hesitant to accept these new
intangible injuries as sufficient for standing.
176. Id.
177. See Trans Union, LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2206 (2021) (holding that even if Congress
creates new statutory protections, without a concrete injury separate from the statutory violation, the
plaintiff will only have standing if the statutory violation is analogous to an injury historically
recognized as a basis for suit in American courts).
178. Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 140 S. Ct. 1440, 1442 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari).
179. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 701 F. App’x 246, 257 (4th Cir. 2017)
(affirming a jury finding of willfulness where there was “abundant evidence” that furnisher acted
recklessly in failing to investigate and correct erroneous information, resulting in both compensatory
and punitive damages).
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CONCLUSION
The Robinson decision presented an opportunity to close the book on a
potential waiver of federal sovereign immunity under the FCRA. While the
decision is indeed settled in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the waiver is alive
and well in the Seventh Circuit, continuing to provide “borrowers of federal
loans in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin . . . a cause of action against the
Federal Government while borrowers with the same types of loans in 14 other
States are barred from suit.”180 As such, either the (1) Seventh Circuit will have
to overturn its own precedent, (2) the Supreme Court will need another
opportunity to weigh in, or (3) Congress will need to amend the FCRA to
resolve the split. With the closure of the Robinson court saga, all these outcomes
are unlikely in the near future.
The Robinson court revealed a significant barrier for a large number of
individuals who are likely to seek redress under the FCRA against “one of the
largest furnishers of credit information in the country.”181 While the FCRA
continues to impose substantive duties upon the federal government, the
Robinson and Daniel decisions exhibit there are no longer any deterrent effects
upon the federal government via the FCRA’s enforcement provisions. Despite
the federal government’s monolithic presence in the United States’ credit
landscape, consumers are nearly powerless to demand the federal government
comply with the FCRA, regardless of the consequences of violations. As credit
information becomes increasingly interconnected with the ever-accelerating
pace of technological change, while consumer debt continues to simultaneously
balloon, the ramifications of noncompliance will only compound.
As such, Congress should amend the language of § 1681n(a) to mimic the
language found in the FCRA’s recognized waiver of sovereign immunity,
§ 1681u(j), changing § 1681n(a) to read “any person” or, additionally, “any
agency or department of the United States” in willful noncompliance with the
FCRA shall be liable for damages. Use of those “magic words” has been deemed
essential to waiver and is essential to holding the federal government
accountable under the FCRA.
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